Part 1 of 4 – The Framework as Designed

Few questions cut closer to the heart of Malaysia’s constitutional design than the relationship between religious freedom and the place of Islam in the Federation. There is no apparent contradiction between the two, as they seem to have been drafted with the expectation that both could coexist.

Yet the law governing a person’s profession of faith looks very different today from how it looked in the decades after independence. This series traces that development – where the law has remained faithful to the constitutional framework, and where it has drifted from it. This is a 4-Part article covering developments from the inception of Malaysia until most recently. Part 1 covers 1957 to 1991: the framework as designed, and the authorities that stood at the close of that period. Part 2 turns to the gap that opened in the 1990s and how it was filled. Part 3 follows the years leading up to 2021. Part 4 brings the story to the present.

1957-1963: A Foundation Built on the Constitution

When the Reid Commission drafted Malaya’s independence constitution in 1956–57, the Alliance submitted a joint memorandum proposing that Islam be declared the religion of the State. The memorandum was explicit:

“the observance of this principle shall not impose any disability on non-Muslim nationals professing and practising their own religions, and shall not imply that the State is not a secular State.” ¹

The 1957 White Paper confirmed the same: the declaration that Islam is the religion of the Federation “will in no way affect the present position of the Federation as a secular State.” ²

Five years later, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak negotiated entry into the enlarged Federation. Singapore’s membership lasted two years; the Borneo States remained. The Cobbold Commission, reporting on North Borneo and Sarawak in 1962, heard the same concern. The non-Muslim communities, its Chairman and British members recorded, were “most insistent that there should be complete religious freedom”. Its Malayan members agreed that Islam should be the national religion, and recorded that the proposal “in no way jeopardises freedom of religion in the Federation, which in effect would be secular”.³ Two constitutional moments, five years apart, saying the same thing.

Both spoke of non-Muslims, because that was the anxiety they had to answer: whether declaring Islam the religion of the Federation would disadvantage those who did not profess it, or alter the secular character of the State. The Constitution, when drafted, did not confine its guarantee to non-Muslims.

Article 3(1) declared Islam the religion of the Federation. Article 11(1) guaranteed every person the right to profess and practise his religion. Article 11(1) confers the right on “every person.” Article 3(4) provides that nothing in Article 3 “derogates from any other provision of this Constitution.” And the one place Article 11 treats Muslims distinctly is clause (4), which permits State law to restrict the propagation of other doctrines among persons professing Islam – a restriction on what others may preach, not on what a Muslim may himself profess. Had the framers intended to withhold clause (1) from Muslims, clause (4) is where it would say so.

The framers were explicit that these provisions were designed to operate together – that the position of Islam would not displace every person’s freedom to profess and practise their religion, and that the Constitution itself would remain the supreme law of the land.⁴

1964 – A Case on What “Profess” Means

This case came from the Singapore High Court, at a time when Singapore was part of the Federation of Malaysia and subject to the same Federal Constitution.

In Re Mohamed Said Nabi, decd, decided on 2 November 1964, Justice Chua had to determine whether a deceased man was a Muslim at the date of his death.⁵ The Muslims Ordinance 1957 defined a Muslim as a person who professes the religion of Islam, so the question turned on what “profess” meant.⁶ The testator had been born a Muslim, had changed his name by deed poll to Michael Sidney Nabi, and his widow – herself by then a Roman Catholic – gave evidence that he drank alcohol, ate pork, rarely attended the mosque, did not fast, and had told friends he was a Christian.

To answer the question the Singapore High Court had to say what professing a religion means. Chua J took the ordinary sense of the word from the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary: to affirm, or declare one’s faith in or allegiance to a religion. ⁷

What the case turned on, in the end, was renunciation. Chua J held that a man born a Muslim remains one unless there is something amounting to a renunciation of that faith – non-observance is not enough.⁸ Leaving is an act of the person, and the question is whether he has done it. It is worth noting who decided it. It was a civil court that determined a man’s religious status on the evidence before it, and no one suggested the question lay elsewhere.

A Framework That Worked Quietly

What is striking about the first three decades after Merdeka is how few cases on religious status reached the courts. That was not because the question never arose. It was because, for those who needed it, the matter was largely handled administratively rather than judicially.

Several states had express statutory provisions dealing with renunciation.

In Perak, s 146(2) of the Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1965 provided: “This Enactment is binding on all Muslims and if any Muslim converts himself to other religion he shall inform Court of his decision and the Court shall publicise such conversion.” ⁹

In Johor, s 141(2) of the Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1978 provided: “Whoever is aware of a Muslim person has converted out of the Islamic Religion shall forthwith report the matter to the Kadi by giving all necessary particulars and the Kadi shall announce that such person has been converted out of the Islamic Religion and shall register accordingly.” ¹⁰

In Pahang, s 103(2) of the Administration of the Religion of Islam and the Malay Custom Enactment 1982 went further: “Any person who has embraced the Religion of Islam in accordance with the Part apostatizes from that Religion he shall report to a Court of his decision and the Yang di-Pertua shall register it. Before his decision is reported and registered, he shall be presumed to be still a Muslim.” ¹¹

Negeri Sembilan followed the same model as late as 1991. Section 90(3) of the Administration of Islamic Law (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment 1991 provided that a Muslim – or a convert who had embraced Islam under that Part – who subsequently decided to leave the religion was to report that decision to the Registrar of Converts, and that the Registrar was to register the decision in the prescribed form. Until the decision was reported and registered, the person was to be deemed still to be a Muslim.¹²

These provisions acknowledged at the statutory level that a Muslim could decide to convert to another religion, and provided administrative mechanisms – reporting, registration, publication – for doing so. The Pahang provision in particular spelled out the legal effect with precision: the person remained presumptively Muslim until the renunciation was reported and registered, at which point the change of status took legal effect.¹³

One could reasonably view this as the kind of administrative framework that gives effect to Article 11(1). A person’s profession of faith is a matter for that person. The State’s role is to keep an accurate record of it.

1988: A Constitutional Amendment that changed everything

An amendment to the Federal Constitution was made in 1988 that would, over time, reshape how religious freedom cases are heard. Article 121(1A) was inserted with effect from 10 June 1988. It reads: “The courts referred to in Clause (1) shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter within the jurisdiction of the Syariah courts.” ¹⁴

The amendment had a short legislative passage. It was debated and passed on 18 March 1988. According to Lim Kit Siang, then Parliamentary Opposition Leader, Parliament was given one day’s notice of the Bill, and the vote was 142 in favour and 18 against. ¹⁵

The text itself is narrow. It does not transfer jurisdiction to the Syariah courts. It does not exclude civil court review of state legislation. It does not displace the supremacy of the Constitution under Article 4(1). It allocates jurisdiction between two court systems, each operating within its own sphere. As the Federal Court would confirm three decades later in Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak, Article 121(1A) does not remove the jurisdiction of the civil courts and “the jurisdiction to review the actions of public authorities, and the interpretation of the relevant state or federal legislation as well as the Constitution, lie squarely within the jurisdiction of the civil courts.” ¹⁶

Earlier that same year, the Supreme Court had addressed the reach of Article 3(1) directly. In Che Omar bin Che Soh v Public Prosecutor, the appellants argued that the mandatory death penalty was void because Islam is the religion of the Federation and any law contrary to Islamic injunctions must fall. Lord President, Salleh Abas rejected the argument, holding that Article 3(1) was not intended to operate as a general test of validity for all law.¹⁷ Islam’s constitutional position is declaratory; it does not displace the other provisions of the Constitution.

So by mid-1988, two things were settled on the face of the law. Article 3(1) did not override Article 11(1). And Article 121(1A), on its terms, separated the two court systems without enlarging either. The text of Article 121(1A) is one thing. The doctrine that developed around it in the years that followed is another. A roundtable was convened many years later, in 2006, in Parliament by the Opposition Leader to consider what could be done about consequences of the amendment that had emerged in the years since – an indication that those consequences were not what had been contemplated in 1988. ¹⁸

1988 was also the year the constitutional position of the judiciary itself changed. The Constitution (Amendment) Act 1988 (Act A704), which inserted Article 121(1A), also rewrote Article 121(1).¹⁹ Before 10 June 1988 it provided that “the judicial power of the Federation shall be vested” in the two High Courts; afterwards, that the High Courts “shall have such jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred by or under federal law”.²⁰ The amendment was widely read as the executive’s response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Yap Peng.²¹ In the same year Tun Salleh Abas LP was suspended and, on 8 August, removed from office, and five other judges of the Supreme Court were suspended – six of its ten members.²² Two of the five, Wan Suleiman and George Seah, were removed in October; the other three were reinstated.²³ All three of the judges removed that year had sat on the bench that decided Che Omar only months before. The cases in the years that followed were decided by a judiciary that had lived through those events.

1989: Jamaluddin bin Othman – The Authority After the Amendment

A Supreme Court authority directly on a person’s right to profess and practise religion came in Minister for Home Affairs v Jamaluddin bin Othman, decided on 24 February 1989.²⁴ The case did not concern Article 121(1A), but it was decided after the amendment came into force, and it is the Supreme Court’s first statement on what Article 11 protects.

The respondent, a Malay who had converted to Christianity,²⁵ had been detained under the Internal Security Act 1960, the grounds stating that he had been involved in a plan or programme to propagate Christianity among Malays, and alleging that he had participated in a group formed for that purpose, in a work camp and a seminar, and had converted six Malays to Christianity.

The High Court granted habeas corpus. The trial judge held that the Minister had no power to deprive a person of the right to profess and practise his religion, guaranteed by Article 11, and that if the Minister acted to restrict that freedom, his act would be inconsistent with Article 11 and no order of detention would be valid. ²⁶

The Supreme Court dismissed the Minister’s appeal. Chief Justice of Malaya, Hashim Yeop A Sani, delivering the judgment of the court, said it agreed “wholeheartedly” with the sentiment the trial judge had expressed, but added a rider: “The freedom to profess and practise one’s religion should not be turned into a licence to commit unlawful acts or acts tending to prejudice or threaten the security of the country.” That freedom, he said, “is itself subject to the general laws of the country as expressly provided in cl (5) of art 11” ²⁷

On the facts, the Court held that the grounds alleged no action beyond participation in meetings and seminars; that mere participation could not make a person a threat to the security of the country; and that the alleged conversion of six Malays could not by itself be regarded as such a threat.

The guarantee in Article 11, it held, “must be given effect unless the actions of a person go well beyond what can normally be regarded as professing and practising one’s religion.” ²⁸

The reasoning is direct. Article 11(1) is a fundamental liberty. The decision means that an act of the State restricting that right is unconstitutional. But subject to the express qualification in Article 11(5), the core of the right binds every branch of the State. This position was affirmed by the Supreme Court after Article 121(1A) had come into force.

1990: Susie Teoh – The Right Vests in the Individual

In Teoh Eng Huat v Kadhi, Pasir Mas – the Susie Teoh case – a Buddhist father sought a declaration in 1986 via the High Court of Kelantan that his daughter’s conversion to Islam at age 17 years and 8 months was invalid. ²⁹

The High Court decided that Susie Teoh was well within her rights in Article 11(1) to change her religion. Her father appealed and by the time the appeal had concluded, the daughter had reached age of majority.

The Supreme Court held that in the case of a minor, the right to choose religion lay with the parent or guardian, but upon the age of 18, the right belonged to the individual herself under Article 11(1).³⁰ That reading sits comfortably with Article 12(4), which places decisions about the religious education of a minor with the parent or guardian.

1991: Ng Wan Chan – Jurisdiction Must Be Conferred, Not Implied

In 1991, the High Court decided Ng Wan Chan v Majlis Ugama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor. The plaintiff was the widow of Lee Siew Kee, who had died on 2 May 1991. She sought a declaration that her husband was a Buddhist at the time of his death. The Islamic religious council claimed he had converted to Islam in 1973 and was therefore Muslim at death. ³¹

The council raised a preliminary objection to the High Court’s jurisdiction, relying on Article 121(1A). The court dismissed the objection. It examined s 45(2) and (3) of the Selangor Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952 and found that the matters over which Syariah court jurisdiction had been conferred did not include the determination of whether a person is professing and practising Islam. Since no written law conferred that jurisdiction on the Syariah court, Article 121(1A) did not displace the High Court. ³²

The court’s reasoning went further, and it went to the heart of the constitutional structure: jurisdiction could not be derived by implication. The court then heard the evidence, found the deceased had not properly converted to Islam and declared that the deceased was a Buddhist at the time of his death, and that his widow was entitled to his remains.

That principle follows directly from the text of the Constitution. Item 1 of the State List, Ninth Schedule, empowers State legislatures to constitute Syariah courts – which “shall have jurisdiction only over persons professing the religion of Islam and in respect only of any of the matters included in this paragraph.” ³³ Both limbs matter. The jurisdiction extends only to persons professing Islam, and only to matters expressly listed. A jurisdiction that is not conferred by state enactment is not a jurisdiction at all.

1991: Dalip Kaur – A Call for Clearer Provisions

On 8 November 1991, the Supreme Court decided Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Anor. The appellant sought a declaration that her deceased son had renounced Islam before his death by executing a deed poll. The trial judge found that the signature on the deed poll was not the son’s, and rejected the evidence of his rebaptism. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge had not misdirected himself in law or in fact and declining to disturb his findings. ³⁴

What is often overlooked about Dalip Kaur is what Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ (Malaya) actually said. Speaking for the majority, he stated: “We are of the view that clear provisions should be incorporated in all the State Enactments to avoid difficulties of interpretation by the civil Courts… A clear provision can for example be in the form of a provision imposing obligation on the relevant authority to keep and maintain a register of converts who have executed a deed poll renouncing Islam.” ³⁵

Mohamed Yusoff (Supreme Court Judge), who was on the same bench, agreed in the result but wrote separately. Whether the deceased had renounced Islam, he said, could not be determined by applying the facts according to civil law; it required consideration by jurists qualified in Islamic jurisprudence, and the only forum qualified to do that was the Syariah Court.³⁶ That passage would matter a great deal later.

The Supreme Court also recorded that the renunciation limb of Perak’s s 146(2) Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1965 was repealed in 1975, leaving only the opening words about the Enactment binding all Muslims. The Court added, pointedly, that before the repeal a convert who wished to leave Islam could have the matter certified by the Syariah court.³⁷

So by the time the constitutional landscape changed in 1988, one of those provisions had already been repealed thirteen years earlier. This is the apex court, in 1991, asking State legislatures to do what Johor and Pahang had already done, what Perak had done and then undone, and what Negeri Sembilan had done just months earlier – to provide statutory clarity through registration mechanisms.

What Happened Next – The replacement laws

In the same year Dalip Kaur was decided, Pahang repealed s 103(2) when its 1982 Enactment was replaced by the Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1991. Johor’s 1978 Enactment was replaced in 2003. Negeri Sembilan’s s 90(3) went the same way when the 1991 Enactment was repealed and replaced by the Administration of the Religion of Islam (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment 2003. Perak’s provision, as noted, had gone in 1975. ³⁸

The Negeri Sembilan sequence repays attention, because it can be traced from beginning to end within a single State. The 1991 Enactment was passed by the State Legislative Assembly on 18 March 1991 and assented to on 30 May – months before the Supreme Court asked, in November, for clear provisions to be incorporated in all State Enactments. Negeri Sembilan was not responding to that request. It was legislating in an existing tradition, and doing so at a point when that tradition still appeared to be the settled approach.

None of the replacement enactments preserved the express renunciation provisions. The reporting, the registration, the announcement – all removed.

Selangor is instructive for a different reason. The Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952 contained provisions on conversion into Islam – a register of converts, control of conversions, reporting requirements. It contained nothing on conversion out. That absence was precisely what the High Court relied upon in Ng Wan Chan to find that the civil courts retained jurisdiction. Selangor did not enact an express provision on declarations of religious status until s 61(3)(b)(x) of the Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Selangor) Enactment 2003.

An Observation

The pattern invites a question, and it can be put without imputing motive to anyone.

Between 1965 and 1991, four states had enacted express provisions recognising that a Muslim could leave Islam and providing a mechanism for recording it. In 1991, the Supreme Court called for such provisions to be incorporated in all State Enactments. What followed was not the extension of that model but its replacement by another – one in which the change of status is not recorded but adjudicated. Of the four, not one such provision remains in force today.

The State legislatures that enacted these repeals were, by the nature of their composition, largely made up of members of the faith from which persons were seeking to depart. That is not in itself improper – legislatures reflect the populations that elect them. But it does raise a question that is properly within the scope of constitutional inquiry: when a legislature exercises power under Item 1 of the State List, is it giving effect to the constitutional framework as designed in 1957 and 1962, or is it responding to considerations that lie outside that framework?

The Federal Constitution provides its own answer to how that question is to be resolved. Article 4(1) makes the Constitution the supreme law. Article 74(3) provides that the power to make laws conferred by that Article is exercisable “subject to any conditions or restrictions imposed with respect to any particular matter by this Constitution.” Article 75 provides that where a State law is inconsistent with federal law, the federal law prevails and the State law is void to the extent of the inconsistency. A State legislature has real power to enact laws, but it is not unconstrained. It operates within the Constitution, not alongside it.

Part 1 Conclusion

By the close of 1991, the position on the face of the authorities was reasonably clear.

Che Omar had held that Article 3(1) does not operate as a general test of validity for other law. Jamaluddin had held that the Article 11(1) guarantee must be given effect to unless a person’s actions went well beyond professing and practising a religion. Susie Teoh had confirmed that the right vests in the individual on reaching majority. And Dalip Kaur, properly read, had preserved the civil courts’ interpretive role while asking legislatures for clearer statutory provisions. Four decisions of the Supreme Court, broadly consistent with the framework of 1957 and 1962.

Alongside them stood Ng Wan Chan, a High Court decision, holding that Syariah jurisdiction must be expressly conferred and cannot be derived by implication. While it carries less weight in the hierarchy than the four above it, the question it asked: not whether the civil court had jurisdiction, but whether jurisdiction had been conferred on the Syariah court – which is the order the Constitution requires.

Whether that approach would govern conversion out of Islam is a question the apex court would not address for another eight years. When it did, the answer went the other way. What happened in between is the subject of Part 2.

Part 2 follows: The Gap, and How It Was Filled (1991–2007).

Footnotes

1. Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957 (Colonial No 330, HMSO 1957) para 169, quoting the memorandum submitted by the Alliance. ↩︎
2. Federation of Malaya Constitutional Proposals 1957 (White Paper, Government Printer 1957) para 57 (White Paper) ↩︎
3. Report of the Commission of Enquiry, North Borneo and Sarawak, 1962 (Cmnd 1794, 1962) para 148(e) (Cobbold Commission Report), where the Malayan members recorded that the proposal that Islam be the national religion ‘in no way jeopardises freedom of religion in the Federation, which in effect would be secular’. ↩︎
4. Federal Constitution, arts 3(1), 3(4), 4(1), 11(1), 11(4); Reid Commission Report (n 1) para 169; White Paper (n 2) para 57; Cobbold Commission Report (n 3) para 148(e); Joseph M Fernando, The Making of the Malayan Constitution (MBRAS Monograph No 31, Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 2002); Joseph M Fernando, ‘The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia’ (2006) 37 Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 249, 250–56; Shad Saleem Faruqi, Document of Destiny: The Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia (Star Publications 2008) 138–39 ↩︎
5. Re Mohamed Said Nabi, decd (1965) 31 MLJ 121 (HC Singapore) ↩︎
6. ibid 122, applying the definition of ‘Muslim’ in the Muslims Ordinance 1957 (Singapore), s 2 ↩︎
7. Said Nabi (n 5) 122 ↩︎
8. ibid 122 ↩︎
9. Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1965 (Perak), s 146(2), as originally enacted. The words after ‘all Muslims’ were deleted by the Administration of Muslim Law (Amendment) Enactment 1975 (Perak En 2/1975), s 3, passed on 15 April 1975 and assented to on 29 May 1975. The Malay text is set out in Dalip Kaur v Pegawai Polis Daerah, Balai Polis Daerah, Bukit Mertajam & Anor [1992] 1 MLJ 1 (SC) 7; the English text is as given in Aston Paiva, ‘Religious Cases in the Malaysian Courts’ (Penang Institute, 30 October 2015) 42 https://penanginstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/jml/files/research_papers/Religious-Cases-in-the%20Malaysian-Courts.pdf accessed 10 August 2026 ↩︎
10. Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1978 (Johor), s 141(2). The Malay text is set out in Lina Joy lwn Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan dan lain-lain [2007] 4 MLJ 585 (FC) 606 (Ahmad Fairuz CJ); the English text is as given in Paiva (n 9) 42 ↩︎
11. Administration of the Religion of Islam and the Malay Custom of Pahang Enactment 1982 (En 8/1982) (Enakmen Pentadbiran Ugama Islam dan Adat Resam Melayu Pahang 1982), s 103(2) (author’s translation). The Malay text is set out in archive from the eSyariah portal https://web.archive.org/web/20181209082021/http://www2.esyariah.gov.my/esyariah/mal/portalv1/enakmen2011/State_Enact_Ori.nsf/100ae747c72508e748256faa00188094/0ebac477400a5bfe4825708a0023ccbc?OpenDocument accessed 10 August 2026. See also Soon Singh a/l Bikar Singh v Pertubuhan Kebajikan Islam Malaysia (PERKIM) Kedah & Anor [1999] 1 MLJ 489 (FC) 501 ↩︎
12. Administration of Islamic Law (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment 1991, s 90(3); Soon Singh (n 11) 501. The Malay text is set out in Majlis Agama Islam Negeri Sembilan v Hun Mun Meng [1993] 1 CLJ 179 (HC) 181 ↩︎
13. Administration of Islamic Law (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment 1991, s 90(3).
    The four provisions above are compiled from the enactments themselves. The same pattern is discussed in Nurjaanah Abdullah @ Chew Li Hua, ‘Legislating Faith in Malaysia’ [2007] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 264; and Matthew J Nelson and Dian A H Shah, ‘Operationalizing and Regulating Religious Freedom: Apostasy and Administrative Reasonableness in Malaysia and Beyond’ (2018) 16 International Journal of Constitutional Law 1293, 1303–04 ↩︎
14. Federal Constitution, art 121(1A), inserted by the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1988 (Act A704) with effect from 10 June 1988; see Dalip Kaur (n 9) 7 ↩︎
15. Lim Kit Siang, ‘Moorthy case — Parliamentary Roundtable on Article 121(1A)’ (Media Statement, 31 December 2005) https://limkitsiang.com/archive/2005/dec05/lks3756.htm accessed 10 August 2026. On the circumstances of the amendment, see Andrew Harding, The Constitution of Malaysia: A Contextual Analysis (Hart Publishing 2012) ch 8 ↩︎
16. Indira Gandhi a/p Mutho v Pengarah Jabatan Agama Islam Perak & Ors and other appeals [2018] 1 MLJ 545 (FC) [107] ↩︎
17. Che Omar bin Che Soh v Public Prosecutor [1988] 2 MLJ 55 (SC) 56-57 ↩︎
18. Lim Kit Siang (n 15). The roundtable followed the dispute over the religious status of the late M Moorthy: see Kaliammal a/p Sinnasamy v Majlis Agama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Ors [2012] 3 MLJ 694 (CA) ↩︎
19. Constitution (Amendment) Act 1988 (Act A704); Kevin YL Tan and Jaclyn L Neo, Constitutional Law in Malaysia: Text, Cases & Materials (Sweet & Maxwell, 2023) 307-08 ↩︎
20. Tan and Neo (n 19) 282, 308; Semenyih Jaya Sdn Bhd v Pentadbir Tanah Daerah Hulu Langat [2017] 3 MLJ 561 (FC) [62] ↩︎
21. Public Prosecutor v Dato’ Yap Peng [1987] 2 MLJ 311 (SC); GK Ganesan, ‘The Constitutional Amendment [Part 8/11 – The Malaysian Judiciary Then and Now]’ (GK Legal, 24 August 2026) https://www.gkg.legal/the-constitutional-amendment-1988/ accessed 10 August 2026. ↩︎
22. George Seah, ‘Crisis in the Judiciary’ (Malaysian Bar, 13 May 2005) https://www.malaysianbar.org.my/article/news/legal-and-general-news/legal-news/crisis-in-the-judiciary accessed 20 September 2026; V Anbalagan, Anis Ibrahim and June Ramli, ‘Redemption: Ghost of 1988 Put to Rest’ New Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur, 18 April 2008), reproduced at https://www.malaysianbar.org.my/article/news/bar-news/news/redemption-ghost-of-1988-put-to-rest accessed 20 September 2026. ↩︎
23. Anbalagan, Ibrahim and Ramli (n 22); see also Rais Yatim, Freedom Under Executive Supremacy in Malaysia (Endowment 1995) 100, cited in Tan and Neo (n 18) 283 ↩︎
24. Minister for Home Affairs, Malaysia & Anor v Jamaluddin bin Othman [1989] 1 MLJ 418 (SC) 419 (Abdul Hamid LP, Hashim Yeop A Sani CJ (Malaya) and Ajaib Singh SCJ) ↩︎
25. P Ramakrishnan, ‘Abuse of Power under the ISA’ (Festival of Rights, organised by the Bar Council, HAKAM and Sisters in Islam, 8 December 2001) https://m.aliran.com/archives/monthly/2001/11d.html accessed 25 September 2026. ↩︎
26. Jamaluddin (n 24) 419, citing Jamaluddin bin Othman v Menteri Hal Ehwal Dalam Negeri, Malaysia & Anor [1989] 1 MLJ 368 (HC) ↩︎
27. ibid. ↩︎
28. ibid 420. See also Faruqi (n 4) 331, describing Jamaluddin as a ‘stirring affirmation of the limits of art 149 powers and the sanctity of religious freedom’. ↩︎
29. Teoh Eng Huat v Kadhi, Pasir Mas & Anor [1990] 2 MLJ 300 (SC) ↩︎
30. ibid 301–02 (Abdul Hamid LP), disapproving the High Court’s reasoning in Re Susie Teoh [1986] 2 MLJ 228 (HC), but declining to grant the declaration because the daughter was no longer a minor. ↩︎
31. Ng Wan Chan v Majlis Ugama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor (No 1) [1991] 3 MLJ 174 (HC) ↩︎
32. Ng Wan Chan v Majlis Ugama Islam Wilayah Persekutuan & Anor (No 2) [1991] 3 MLJ 487 (HC) 489; Administration of Muslim Law Enactment 1952 (Selangor), s 45(2)-(3) ↩︎
33. Federal Constitution, Ninth Schedule, List II (State List), item 1 ↩︎
34. Dalip Kaur (n 9) 5, 8 ↩︎
35. ibid 7 ↩︎
36. ibid 9-10 ↩︎
37. ibid 7 ↩︎
38. Administration of Muslim Law (Amendment) Enactment 1975 (Perak) (n 9), s 3; Administration of Islamic Law Enactment 1991 (Pahang); Administration of the Religion of Islam (State of Johor) Enactment 2003; Administration of the Religion of Islam (Negeri Sembilan) Enactment 2003; Dalip Kaur (n 9) 7 ↩︎